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INTRODUCTION 
The District Court has entered a judgment upon a summary judgment motion 
against Appellant KAL, LLC, hereinafter "KAL", imposing upon a ten acre parcel of 
real estate owned by KAL, a perpetual and express easement for ingress, egress and 
utilities for the benefit of an adjoining parcel that is owned by the Marian B. Baker 
Trust dated May 12, 2013, hereinafter "Baker Trust". This easement traverses the 
entire south to north dimension via a winding route across the center of KAL's 
property. This easement imposes a significant burden on the property of KAL. The 
District Court has imposed this burden upon KAL despite an absence of any grant of 
such an easement to Baker Trust or its predecessor in interest, Jose I. Melendreras and 
Jacqueline Z. Melendreras, hereinafter "Melendreras" in any conveyance document of 
record. The Court can correct this manifest error by reversing the decision of the 
District Court holding that the relevant deed is ambiguous, vacating the judgment 
entered by the District Court and remanding the case to the District Court for a trial on 
the merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case about a claimed easement across two ten acre parcels of land in 
Kootenai County near State Line, Idaho. In late 1998 or early 1999 one Jerry 
Mortensen, the owner of Timberland-AG, LLC, built a logging road, now sometimes 
referred to as Alexana Lane, across the two parcels to support his timber removal 
project. The two parcels were among four rectangular ten acre parcels that are 
pertinent to this case. The parcels all shared a common corner. When Timberland-AG 
sold the two western parcels in 1999 to Melendreras Mortensen executed a deed that 
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did not contain language granting to Melendreras a right to use the relevant logging 
road that crossed the two eastern parcels. A legal description of the centerline of the 
logging road was attached to the above referenced deed. The deed referenced the 
logging road in two instances. First as a reservation to Timberland-AG of a right to use 
that portion of the logging road that crossed one of the two parcels it sold. The second 
reference was to establish the easternmost end of an easement which it deeded to 
Melendreras along the north boundary of the KAL, LLC parcel which is the 
northernmost of the two eastern parcels. 
Baker Trust is the successor in interest to Melendreras in ownership of the 
northernmost of the two western parcels. Baker Trust has sought permission from 
Kootenai County to construct a residence on its property. Baker Trust has asserted a 
claim that Timberland-AG agreed to give Melendreras an easement over the logging 
road to access the northernmost of the two parcels he purchased from Timberland-AG 
in 1999. KAL, LLC is the owner of the northernmost of the two eastern parcels that 
are traversed by the logging road having purchased the parcel in 2002. KAL, LLC 
asserts that the deed from Timberland-AG to Melendreras did not grant to 
Melendreras the claimed easement. Several easement theories were plead in the case 
including easement by implication and pursuant to LC. 55-603. 
The trial court granted Baker Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment holding 
that the deed from Timberland-AG to Melendrerases is ambiguous and that Mortensen, 
on behalf of Timberland-AG intended to grant to Melendreras an express easement 
over the logging road to access the parcel now owned by Baker Trust. The trial court 
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found material issues of disputed fact pertaining to all other easement theories 
advanced in the case and denied the motion for summary judgment as to those theories. 
The trial court erroneously found the deed to be ambiguous because it created 
an "absurdity" under one of its interpretations. The alternate interpretation in the 
view of the trial court was reasonable. In making its determination the trial court failed 
to apply the proper legal standard and analysis to the issue of ambiguity. The trial 
court further erred in determining that though there is not any language in the deed to 
support its interpretation of the word it found to be ambiguous, "RESERVING", as 
granting an easement to Melendreras over the logging road, Mortensen's must have 
intended such an easement in deeding the property to Melendreras. The trial court then 
imposed the easement over the logging road. This Court should examine the record, 
apply its own analysis of whether the deed is ambiguous in the manner determined by 
the trial court, reverse the trial court on its finding of ambiguity and subsequent grant 
of an easement to Baker Trust as Melendreras' successor in interest. This Court should 
determine that the deed is not ambiguous as a matter of law and leave to the trial court 
the issue of whether any other easement theory gives Baker Trust the right to use the 
logging road as it traverses the property owned by KAL, LLC. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in holding that the deed from Timberland-AG to 
Melendreras is ambiguous? 
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2. Did the District Court err in interpreting the language of the 1999 deed from 
Timberland-AG to Melendreras as granting to Melendreras an easement over 
the logging road? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court decided this case in the context of a summary judgment 
motion. The standard of review in a similar case was articulated by this Court as 
follows: 
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment using the same 
standard as the district court when it originally ruled on the motion. Carl H. 
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,870,993 P.2d 1197, 1201 
(1999). Therefore, we affirm summary judgment when "pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). On summary judgment, the Court 
liberally construes all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draws all 
reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Hill v. 
Hill, 140 Idaho 812,813, 102 P.3d 1131, 1132 (2004). We deny summary 
judgment if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw 
conflicting inferences from the evidence. Id. If no disputed issues of material 
fact exist, then only a question of law remains. In/anger v. City of Salmon, 137 
Idaho 45, 47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2003). This Court exercises free review over 
questions of law. Id. 
Camp Easton Forever, Inc. vs. Inland Northwest Council Boy Scouts of America, 156 
Idaho 893, 332 P.3d 805, 809 (2014). More recently this Court said, "This Court 
reviews an appeal from an order of summary judgment de novo, and this Court's 
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a 





A. The District Court erred in holding that the 1999 deed from Timberland AG, 
LLC, (Mortensen) is ambiguous. 
The District Court issued its decision in this case from the bench. There is no 
record of the decision of the District Court except the transcript of the hearing at which 
its decision was delivered on June 29, 2016. A complete copy of the transcript of the 
hearing is a part of the record. A copy of that transcript is attached hereto for ease of 
reference as Exhibit A to this brief. 
The analytical standard for assessing whether or not a deed is ambiguous was 
clearly stated by this Court: 
When this Court interprets a deed, our primary goal is to give effect to the 
parties' real intent. Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636, 639, 315 P.3 824, 827 (2013). 
If a deed's language is ambiguous, the parties' intention becomes a question of 
fact settled by a trier of fact. Id. The trier of fact must consider all of the 
surrounding facts and circumstances and view the deed as a whole and in its 
entirety. Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 773, 118 P.3d 99, 105(2005). 
However, "[w]hen an instrument conveying land is unambiguous, the intention 
of the parties can be settled as a matter of law using the plain language of the 
document" and without using extrinsic evidence. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 
399,404, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217 (2008). 
A deed is ambiguous when its language is reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretations. Id. A deed is not ambiguous merely because the parties present 
differing interpretations to the Court. Hoch 155 Idaho at 639, 315 P3d at 827. 
Instead, "conflicting interpretations may arise when a phrase lends itself, 
without contortion, to a number of inconsistent meanings." Porter, 146 Idaho at 
404, 105 P.3d at 1217. To determine whether a deed is ambiguous, the deed 
must be reviewed as a whole. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503,508, 65 P.3d 525, 
530 (2003). 
Camp Easton Forever, Inc., 156 Idaho at 989-990, 332 P.3d at 811-812. 
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The District Court held that a portion of the February 5, 1999 Warranty Deed 
from Timberland-AG, LLC to Melendreras is ambiguous. T. June 29, 2016, pp. 5-7. 
The particular language is found in Exhibit A to the Warranty Deed, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as B. The specific form of Exhibit A to the deed is important to a 
proper understanding of the document. The presentation of the relevant language in 
the transcript materially differs from its presentation in Exhibit A in that the transcript 
combined two paragraphs into one, potentially altering the clear meaning of the 
language in Exhibit A. The language appears in Exhibit A to the deed after a metes and 
bounds description of the northernmost of the two parcels, Parcel 2, purchased by 
Melendreras as follows: 
RESERVING THEREFROM a strip of land sixty (60) feet in width paralleling 
the north boundary line of Parcel 2 which shall serve as an easement for ingress, 
egress and utilities. 
TOGETHER WITH a sixty (60) foot easement of the purpose of ingress, egress 
and utilities along the north boundary line of Tract 9, legally described in 
Exhibit "C" and west of the Ingress, Egress and Utilities easement described in 
Exhibit "B". 
SAID EASEMENTS and all conditions, and restrictions relating thereto shall be 
considers as running with the land and shall bind the grantees and its heirs, 
executors, and administrators, and all future assigns of said premises or any 
part thereof. 
R. at page 78. It is notable that the same format, meaning a metes and bounds 
description of a conveyed parcel followed by reservations and another grant related to 
of portions of the described parcel was used earlier in Exhibit A to the deed. 
The District Court observed that the above recited language from Exhibit A to 
the deed "could reserve to Timberlake and easement across Tracts 7 and 8 that it sold 
to Melendreas, but that language would not and should not and could not reserve to 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
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itself an easement across the rest of the tracts that Timberland continued to own. That 
would be an unreasonable reading of the intent of that language, that Timberlake-
Timberland would be reserving to itself an easement through land that it currently 
owned at the time of the conveyance". T. June 29, 2016, p.7, ll.17-25. The District Court 
later commented in the same hearing as follows: 
The Court: The Court focuses I think on the word-the wording of the deed, 
that the Court took some time to find of reserving. So the Court finds that to be 
an ambiguous phrase in the context of the entire deed in that the literal reading 
of that deed with respect to that word "reserving", it creates an absurdity in the 
Court's mind that Timberland was reserving to itself an easement through land 
it already owned. 
Mr. Covington: Okay. 
The Court: Therefore, the Court finds that the intent of the grantor was to grant 
an easement to the Melendreas and to reserve to itself an easement only throur.h 
the properties that it just conveyed to the Melendreas. 
T. June 29, 2016, pp. 13-14. Thus the District Court's analysis concludes that the word 
"RESERVNG" to be ambiguous having one meaning that creates an absurdity and 
another, which is a reasonable interpretation that Timberland was reserving an 
easement across property it was conveying and grant an easement to Melendreras. The 
grant to Melendreras in the deed plainly says sixty feet along the north boundary of 
Tract 9, a parcel that was retained at the time by Timberland. "A deed is ambiguous 
when its language is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Camp Easton 
Forever, Inc., 156 Idaho at 900, 332 P3.d at 812. The District Court erred in holding the 
deed to be ambiguous when only one interpretation is reasonable and the other is a 
contortion generating an absurd meaning. "Conflicting interpretations may arise when 
no potential boundary line unambiguously fits the language contained in the deed." 
Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497,500, 112 P3.d 785, 788 (2005). "Neither of the drainage 
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ditches, nor the creek channel, unambiguously fit the language contained in the deeds, 
making the intentions of the drafters unclear." Id. In the case now before this Court 
only the interpretation of "RESERVING" meaning an easement to Timberland across 
land conveyed to Melendreras and granting an easement to Melendreras sixty feet wide 
along a portion of the North boundary line of Tract 9 fits the language in the deed. In 
fact, the fit for such an interpretation is perfect. The deed is not ambiguous because 
there is only one reasonable interpretation that fits. 
B. The District Court erred in interpreting the language of the deed to grant to 
Melendreras an easement over the logging road in the deed Timberland-AG, 
LLC gave to Melendreras in 1999? 
If an ambiguity is determined, "The trier of fact must then determine the intent 
of the parties according to the language of the conveyance and the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction." Neider, 138 Idaho at 508, 65 P.3d at 530. Having found 
the deed to be ambiguous, the District Court further erred in adding a new easement to 
the deed rather than applying its chosen interpretation of the words of the deed. It is as 
if the declaration of ambiguity provided a basis in the mind of the District Court to 
insert new terms into the deed, meaning a new easement in favor of Melendreras over 
the logging road. There is no interpretation presented of "RESERVING" in the 
language of the conveyance meaning a new easement over the logging road. In this 
respect the District Court's conclusion fails the test of Neider because the language of 




The District Court erred in finding that the 1999 deed from Timberland-AG, 
LLC to Melendreras is ambiguous in its use of the word "RESERVING". The meaning 
of the term in the context of the deed is clear, logical and consistent with the pattern 
and language used by the drafter throughout the document of conveyance. As the deed 
is truly unambiguous, its meaning is clear that an easement was reserved in favor of the 
grantor, Timberland-AG, LLC, over a portion of Tract 8 and Melendreras were 
granted an easement over a portion along the north boundary line of Tract 9. Even if 
the deed were ambiguous there is no meaning of "RESERVING" that includes a grant 
of a new and different easement. The deed contains no grant of an easement to 
Melendreras over the logging road, Alexana Lane. The judgment should be vacated, 
the deed held to be unambiguous and the matter remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
Dated this 29th day of June, 2017. ,/<::J 
I ,/Jt. .~ .. - ........ . tob rt111 ,,,._o..,.~v"ington i 
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1 Do you know what that's about? 
2 MR. McCREA: They were named defendants, I 
3 believe. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. 
5 MR. McCREA: And they --
6 THE COURT: I never saw that in any of the 
7 pleadings. 
8 MR. McCREA: The original case caption, I believe 
9 they were named defendants, and they declined to appear or 
IO plead. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: We're on the record in the matter of 
Baker vs. Stadler, et al. This is Civil Case 15-1484 
And in the matter Mr. Stephen McCrea is in court 
representing plaintiff. And Mr. Ben Slaughter is appearing 
telephonically on behalf of the plaintiff as well. 
Mr. Art Macomber is present representing 
defendants John and Vickie Stadler. 
Mr. Robert Covington is present representing KAL, 
LLC. 
Jose and Jaqueline Melendreas are presentin court 
today. They are self represented litigants. 
This is the time set for the Court to announce its 
decision regarding plaintifls' motion for summary judgmeni 
but I have one housekeeping matterfirst, and that is that I 
wanted to inquire Mr. McCrea. 
There is an original proposed order in the Court's 
file, an order for entry of default, and it's listing a 
default against parties Karen Charbonneau, Jay From kin, 
Don Stephens and Gail Stephens, but it's under this case 
number and this case caption. 
4 
1 The Court has certainly reviewed thewritten 
2 submissions of the parties. It listened carefully to the 
3 oral arguments the other day regarding plaintiffs motion 
4 for summary judgment. And ru cut to the chase right away 
5 and say the Court is going to grant plaintiffs motion for 
6 summary judgment 
7 Some of the facts that a rein the record that the 
8 Court has considered include that Timbedand Ag owned 
9 Tracts 5 through 12 of the subject property originally, or 
10 at least at the origination of the facts before this Court 




MR. McCREA: And so they were notified we wouldn't 12 think north to south, anyway, Lots 5, 6, 11, 10, 7, 
recrosses back into 10, and again -- or again, then crosses 
Tract 9. 
assess costs against them. 13 
THE COURT: All right. All right. That explains 14 
15 that. 
16 You know, now that I am looking at your -- I 
17 didn't see it in one of the earlier pleadings, but now I do 
18 see those names, so thank you for clarifying that. 
19 All right. The Courfs ready to makean oral 
20 pronouncement then today on defendants' motion for summary 
21 judgment, and so -- excuse me - plaintiffs motion for 
22 summary judgment And so the findings articulated by the 
23 Court today and the conclusions articulated by the Court are 
24 those findings and conclusions thatsupport the ultimate 
25 decision of the Court. 
f"'"···· ;e 
15 Timberland Ag used this Alexanna Lane for itl own 
16 purposes when it owned all eight of those tracts in order to 
17 access Tract 8 of that property. 
18 In 1999 a warranty deed conveying property was 
19 executed from TimberlandAg to Jose and Jaqueline 
20 Melendreas, that conveyed to the Melendreases ownership in 
21 Tracts 7 and 8 of the subject properties.That conveyance by 
22 warranty deed included easement language, that has been the 
23 subject of this dispute. 
24 That warranty deed also referencedand 
25 incorporated Exhibits 8, which the Court-- Exhibit B, 
5 6 
1 excuse me, which the Court finds to be the legal description 1 of a reserved easementby written instrument. 
2 of Alexanna Lane,and also Exhibit C, which the Court finds 2 The deed language that has been at issu~ the deed 
3 to be the description of what's been called I thinkfor ease 3 from Timberland to the Melendreases, this Court finds as a 
4 the 60-foot easement stripofland that runs from Tract9 4 matter oflaw to bean ambiguous document. 
5 into Tract 8. 5 The Court finds it to be ambiguous because of the 
6 There is evidence in the record, although it's not 6 language in that regarding the reservation ofan easement in 
7 necessarily germane to the Court's finding, but the Court 7 that language. And I should -- the Court should probably 
8 did make a note of it, that the Melendreas party has 8 cite all of that subject language here. 
9 improved Alexanna Lane, at least at some degree after buying 9 Let me find it. 
10 property, the tracts mentioned above in 1999, and claimed 10 Just one momentwhile I try to find that. 
11 use of Alexanna Lane itself, the Melendreses to access Tract 11 The subject language that was at dispute her~ 
12 Number 8. 12 that the Court finds to be language that createsan 
13 The record should reflect that the KAL party 13 ambiguity in this warranty deed reads as follows: 
14 bought Tract 9 in 2002. The Stadlers brought Tract 10 in 14 "It was reserving therefrom a strip of land 
15 2006. 15 60 feet in width parallelling the north boundary of 
16 Melendreases sold Tract 8 to the plaintiff in 16 Parcel 2, which is Tract 8, which shall serve as an easement 
17 2014, together with a deed and an easement to access 17 for ingresi.-egress and utilities. Together with a 60-foot 
18 Tract 8, the same easement access that isAlexanna Lane, 18 easement for the same purpose ofingress~gress and 
19 that was the subject of Exhibit B of the warranty deed from 19 utilities, along the north boundary line of Tract 9, legally 
20 Timbe.-Iand Agto the Melendreases. 20 described in Exhibit C, and west of the ingresi.-egress 
21 In this matter plaintiff has argued that they have 21 utilities easement described inExhibit B. 
22 an easement for all ofAlexanna Lane conveyed to them by the 22 "Said easements and all conditions and 
23 Melendreases, and -- and also, not only that lane itself, 23 restrictions relating thereto shall be consider.;" --
24 but the extension or the property described in Exhibit C of 24 spelling error -- "as running with the land, and shall bind 
25 the warranty deed of 1999, extension into Tract 8 by virtue 25 the grantees and its heirs, executors, administrators,and 
7 8 
1 all future assigns of said premisesof any part thereof." 1 This Court therefore concludes, based on the 
2 So, that was the nature of the language that this 2 record before it, that there is no contraryevidence, and, 
3 Court found to create in this warranty deed an ambiguity, 3 therefore, no genuine issue of material fact that Timberland 
4 such that it is an ambiguous document. Therefore, because 4 intended to grant an easement-- that other than Timberland 
5 that document, that warranty deed is ambiguous on its face, 5 intended to grant an easement to Melendreases to cross 
6 or a latent ambiguity, even as argued by the parties, but 6 Tracts 5, 6, 11, 10 and 9 all the way into Tract 8. And in 
7 the Court finds it to be even patently ambiguous as well. 7 the same document to reserve itself-- to itself an easement 
8 Therefore, the intent of the grantor is a matter of fact to 8 to cross Sections7 and 8 that it had just sold to the 
9 be determined either on summary judgment or at trial on the 9 Melendreases. Therefore, this Court finds specific that 
10 matter. 10 Melendreases specifically and expresslygranted to plaintiff 
11 Defendants Stadlers have argued that there is no 11 the easement rights that it had received fromTimberlake --
12 ambiguity in the Timberlake [sic) deed, that the deed 12 Timberland. I keep saying Timberlake; it's Timberland 
13 reserves to Timberlake an easement>ver the property it sold 13 The Court therefore finds that the theory 
14 to Melendreases. 14 propounded by plaintiffs that they have an easemen~ 
15 This Court finds that language to be ambiguous 15 reserved easementby written instrument is a valid, and 
16 because the legal description of the easementin the grant 16 there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the 
17 to Mr. and Mrs. Melendreas could reserve to Timberlake an 17 intent of the grantor Timberland 
18 easement acrossTracts 7 and 8 that it sold to the 18 Now, for pu1·poses ofpotential review, the Court 
19 Melendreases, but that language would not and should not and 19 has analyzed the other theories that plaintiff has proposed. 
20 could not reserve to itself an easement across the rest of 20 The plaintiff proposed they had an easement by 
21 the tracts that Timberland continued to own. That would be 21 implied prior use. The Court finds that there are genuine 
22 an unreasonable reading ofthe intent of that language, that 22 issues of material fact in this instance regarding the 
23 Timberlake -- Timberlandwould be reserving to itself an 23 elemenls of that theory of what is called continuous long 
24 easementthrough land that it currently owned at the time of 24 use, long enough before conveyance to show that the use was 
25 the conveyance. 25 intended to be permanent. That may or may not be the case. 
9 
1 There were issues of fact regarding that continuous use such 
2 that it was intended to be permanent, and cannot grant 
3 easement or the relief sought by plaintiff under that 
4 theory. 
5 Plaintiffs propounded the theory of easement by 
6 necessity. This Court finds that there are genuine issues 
7 of fact regarding great present necessity foran easement 
8 That may or may not be the case. That would need to have 
9 been decided at trial on the merits. 
10 The plaintiffs propounded the theory of easement 
11 by prescriptio1L The Court finds there are genuine issues 
12 of fact 1·egarding whether the use was by permissio11 the use 
13 of the parties involved here washy permission of the 
14 servient estate, and the basis -- primarily based on the 
15 affidavit of David White that Mr. Melendreas at some point 
16 had asked if White minded if Mr. Melendreas was on White's 
17 property. The Court finds that to be a small piece of 
18 evidence, but one that fits into a genuine issue of material 
19 fact about whether the use by Mr. and Mrs. Melendreas, orby 
20 the -- no, not by Timberland, but by the Melendreases was 
21 with permissio1L Nevertheless, whether Mr.Melendreas 
22 thought he needed permissioq or whether-- whether 
23 Mr. White thought he could give permissioq that's a moot 
24 point because this Court finds that an express easement was 
25 granted to the Melendreases, and then likewise to the 
11 
1 MR. MACOMBER: Well, the motion for summary 
2 judgment was brought against theStadler's counterclaims 
3 only. And so none of the claims of the-- the other claims 
4 of the plaintiffs, or the claims ofKAL, or the claims of 
5 Melendreas, or Bakeragainst Melendreas are settled here. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. McCrea, what's your position on 
7 that? 
8 That's a good -- that's a good point. 
9 MR. McCREA: Right. 
10 Your Honor, the original case sought to quiet 
11 title to the easement foringress and egress should cross 
12 the northern boundary ofTract8. The counterclaim alleged 
13 that there was no easement to that parcel at all and so, 
14 therefore, the motion for summary judgmentwas in response 
15 to that counterclaim. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you for that. 
17 I'm glad you pointed that out. That clarifies 
18 that. Thank you, Mr. Macomber. 
19 MR. SLAUGHTER: Your Honor, can I weigh in for 
20 that? 
21 THE COURT: You may, Mr. Slaughter. Go ahead. 
22 MR. SLAUGHTER: I apologize. 
23 And maybe I'm misunderstanding,but I think that 
24 the Court's ruling was that there's an express finding that 
25 the -- the easement, or that the deed in question granted an 
10 
1 plaintiffs. 
2 Also, the Court -- the plaintiffs proposed a 
3 theory of relief for themselves on an easement by transfer 
4 from Melendreas to Baker pursuant to Idaho CodeSection 
5 55-603. Again, the Court finds that there are genuine 
6 issues of material fact as to whether the easement was 
7 obviously and permanently used by the Melendreases. 
8 The Court simply makes those particular findings 
9 for purposes of potential further review 
10 With that, then, and based on those findings and 
11 conclusions, again the Court grants plaintiffs motion for 
12 summary judgment 
13 Are there any questions from the plaintiff? 
14 MR. McCREA: No, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. Macomber? 
16 MR.MACOMBER: Yes, YourHonor. ljustwantto 
17 clarify that the notes you just gave on thegenuine issues 
18 of fact related to the other ofplaintifrs claims are not 
19 included in the summary judgment but the summary judgment 
20 is just on what they motioned for, which was the Stadler's 
21 counterclaims? 
22 THE COURT: Yes. 
23 Well, say that again. 
24 Now, I thought I followed you, and then I lost 
25 you. 
12 
1 easement, and, therefore, although the motion for summary 
2 judgment only sought to dismiss the counterclaims otStadler 
3 and KAL, it effectively has had a dispositive effect on --
4 on the counterclaim that-- or I guess the first amended 
5 complaint that's being filed, or I guess will at this point 
6 in time it should be entered into the Court for filing for 
7 acceptance of the order that's been proposed wherein the 
8 plaintiff is seeking affirmativerelief, declaring the right 
9 to use all Alexanna Lane, and one of the theories is that 
10 there's an express grant of easement as the Court just 
11 found. And so I -- I don't think that we need to -- if I 
12 understood Mr. Macomber'squestion, is -- is he's thinking 
13 that we need to go through some more procedural hoops tog et 
14 to the point where the Court would affirmatively grant the 
15 relief being sought in the first amended complairt that's in 
16 the process of being filed. I think that-- I think it's 
17 kind of a procedural-- it's unnecessary for us to go 
18 through any more hoops. I think at this time judgment would 
19 be appropriate to -- for the Court to declare that there is 
20 a right to use the easementfor -- for the benefit of Baker 
21 to have access along Alexanna Lane, and the Tract9 easement 
22 in order to reach Tract8. 
23 THE COURT: Well, thank you. 
24 That may be the case. And the Court realized it 
25 was being a bit expansive here, and I think in analyzing the 
13 
1 summary judgmentmotion with respect to the counterclaim 
2 established, I think the Court had to address really many of 
3 the other theories as well. So, that may or may not be the 
4 case. And when-- I was going to ask the parties, after I 
5 asked them if there was any questions, where they thought 
6 the -- that this decision left the status of this case. And 
7 so we'll find out about that in a moment But I thank you 
14 
1 THE COURT: Therefore, the Court finds that the 
2 intent of the grantor was to grant an easement to the 
3 Melendreasesand to reserve to itself an easement only 
4 through the properties that it just conveyed to the 
5 Melendreases. 
6 MR. COVINGTON: Okay. I think I got it 








for your thoughts on that. 8 Any other questions? 
Any other questions, Mr. Macomber'! 9 Mr. Melendreas,any questions from yoi/! 
MR. MACOMBER: No, Your Honor: 10 MR. MELENDREAS: No, sir. No, Your Honor. I --
THE COURT: Mrs. Melendreas, any questions? THE COURT: Mr. Covington, any questions? 11 
MR. COVINGTON: Your Honor, I wanted to make suli MS. MELENDREAS: Yes. 
I understood where the Court found ambiguity, and I'm trying 13 Okay. What you just said was correct because 
Timberland Ag still owned the property. to recall the Court's description of that. I don't want to 
15 belabor it unduly, but I want to have a clear picture in my 
16 mind. 
17 THE COURT: The Court focuses I think on the 
18 word -- the wording of the deed, that the Court took some 
19 time to find of reserving. So the Court finds that to be an 
20 ambiguous phrase in the context of the entire deed, in that 
21 the literal reading of that deed with respect to thatword 
22 "reserving", it creates an absurdity in the Court's mind 
23 that Timberland was reserving to itself an easementthrough 
24 land it already owned. 
25 MR. COVINGTON: Okay. 
15 
1 original -- plaintiffs original claim, which-- which 
2 portion of the case I represent my client on, which was his 
3 request to quiet title to the 60-foot easement across 
4 Tract 8, that still remains a matter that needs to be 
5 litigated if my client intends to continue to pursue that. 
6 THE COURT: All right. 
14 
15 THE COURT: Do have any questions? 
16 I don't want comments I want to know if you have 
17 any questions about the Court's ruling. 
18 MS. MELENDREAS: Not at the moment 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Sorry to cut you off like that, 
20 but I do need to keep it in line of what we're asking here. 
21 So, with that, let me turn to Mr.McCrea and/or 
22 Mr. Slaughter and find out where do you see this leaving the 
23 status of the case based on the ruling, and the extent to 
24 which the Court has entered findings and conclusions? 
25 MR. McCREA: I think there-- as to the 
16 
1 been resolved We can just skip the procedural mechanisms 
2 if -- to the extent any remain, in order to just get to the 
3 point, which is my client has the right to use the existing 
4 road to access its property. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 












MR. McCREA: Other than that, I would defer to 7 reminded the Court of an important finding it needed to make 
here. Mr. Slaughter for any further comment. 8 
THE COURT: Mr. Slaughter, where do you think this 9 
leaves? 10 
I think youive mentioned it, but go ahead and make 11 
your record about where you think this leavesthe case. 12 
MR. SLAUGHTER: Well, Your Honor,I think I even 13 
addressed it in my reply memorandull\ that I think that 14 
effectively, especially since this is a court trial, I don't 15 
see any impediment at this point in time to filing 16 
declaratory judgment or quieting title in favor of the Baker 17 
The Court has engaged in this analysis pursuant to 
Rule 56, which requires the Court to view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, which are 
the defendants in this case. But also because this is 
scheduled as a Court trial, the Court is allowed to draw all 
reasonable inferences, because it will be the finder of fact 
at a tria~ to draw all reasonable inferences from the 
evidence, not necessarily in favor of the nonmoving party, 
but as the Court sees them to be reasonable. So, that's 
18 Trust for finding an easement, an access easement along 
19 Alexanna Lane and the Tract 9 easement to the Baker 
20 property. 
18 been the manner in which the Court has engaged in this 
19 analysis. 
21 So, I -- procedurally, the first-- the proposed 
22 first amended complailt has not been filed and serve!\ but I 
23 think the nature of the Court'sruling is such that there's 
24 no need to go down that path. At least in my opinion, but 
25 I'll leave that up to the Court. I believe that the issue's 
20 So, Mr. Macomber, where to yousee the status of 
21 this case here? Do you have any input on that at this 
22 point? 
23 MR. MACOMBER: I don't, Your Honor. I'd have to 
24 go back and take a look 
25 THE COURT: Sure. Understood 
17 
1 How about you, Mr. Covington? 
2 MR. COVINGTON: Well, certainly the issue that 
3 Steve originally raised in the initial pleading here remains 
4 unresolved, and I think none of us have really focu!l!d much 
5 effort thus far on even discovery related to the claim. His 
6 claim is that it-- excuse me, Steve, ifl am mistakm, but 
7 generally quieting title under some theory so that my client 
8 does not have the right to use the 60-acre-- a 60-foot 
9 easement across Tract8. 
IO Correct me if I'm wrong. 
11 MR. McCREA: No, that's --
12 MR. COVINGTON: And I don't know exactly what 
13 theory there is for quieting that title, but that's what 
14 remains, and very little work has been done thus far, I can 
15 tell the Court, on that issue. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Very good Thank you for 
17 that. That's a good reminder for the Court. 
18 Mr. Melendreas, do you have any input on where you 
19 see the status of the case based on the Court's ruling? 
20 MR. MELENDREAS: What I'd like to bring up, 
21 Your Honor, is I see this case in two parts. One of'em is 
22 what we've addressed here today as far as showing 
23 (unintelligible) to Tract 8. 
24 It's my understanding that if Mr.Espinoza wants 
25 to do this quiet title to remove the easement from his 
19 
1 the -- based on the conclusions articulated by the Court 
2 today. 
And then in terms of further proceedings in the 
matter, I'm simply going to leave it to the parties to 
18 
1 property, that really, in my opinion, has nothing to do with 
2 us. Once that potential -- I just want to make sure that 
3 that part of the case is separated and cleared What he 
4 continues to do on his property is his business beyond this 
5 point. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Thank yotL 
7 MR. MELENDREAS: The other thing is well, once 
8 this ruling is in, will the lis pendens be removed? 
9 THE COURT: I don't know. That's -- that's going 
IO to require some discussion among the parties, I think, or 
11 further motion practice. 
12 MR. MELENDREAS: Thank you, sir. 
13 THE COURT: Mrs. Melendreas, do you have any inpu1 
14 on the status of this case based on the Court's ruling? 
15 MS. MELENDREAS: No, thank yotL 
16 THE COURT: And if you do, please speakup. 
17 sort of rudely cut you off just a few minutes ago, I don't 
18 want you to be quieted by that. If you have something you 
19 would like to say about the status, pleasedo. 
20 MS. MELENDREAS: (No oral response.) 
21 THE COURT: Okay. Very good. 
22 All right. With that, then, I'm going to ask 
23 Mr. McCrea to present an order to the Court granting 
24 plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, or Mr. Slaughter, 
25 whichever is the appropriate way, for the reasons, and for 
20 
1 Alexanna Laneis truly that whole thing, then it probably 
2 includes that -- easement, and if somebody wants to build a 









discuss among themselves the status as they see it, and the 5 
build a dally, so it's a little perhaps prematureto just 
focus on the 60-footand say that's all that's left 
court will await then any further motion practice and any 6 
further notices of hearings, and we'll let the parties drive 7 
I guess the next -- the next issues that go fonvard. 8 
MR. COVINGTON: Your Honor, I guess I'll raise the 9 
THE COURT: Well, it sounds like there'smore 
thinking that needs to be done, more discussion, possibly 
more motion practice. 
Right now we'll leave that trial setting in place. 
10 thought that we have a trial settingfor sometime in 
11 September. 
12 THE COURT: Right. 
IO The parties can either stipulate with good cause or have 
11 notice of hearing on vacating the trial, if need be. I sure 
12 like to shoot for those trials dates whenever possible. 






MR. COVINGTON: I don't think my clients going to 14 
abandonment the easement. So do you --
MR. McCREA: I can't really-- I can't really say. 
I have to discuss with my client at this point 





19 the request to have that we consider rescheduling the trial 19 






my client has the strongest interest in this easement that 21 
is across Steve's property. But I would like to putthat 22 
out there because we all have plans and stuff. 23 
THE COURT: All right. 24 
MR. MACOMBER: Then the other. point being that if 25 
a good argument. Thankyou for good briefing and for being 
willing to listen to the Court today. With that, you are 
excused 







6 I, KIM J. HANNAN, do hereby certify that the 
21 
7 foregoing pages nurrbered fron 2-20, constitute a true and 
8 accurate transcript of my stencgraphic notes, taken at said 
9 tirre and place, all done to the best of my skill and 
10 ability. 

















trw ;.:1,m1or(,~· f do(n,i:) herehy grant, bargain, sell und ecnvey unto Cl. 4 ~ 
_ ·i1 -Qr 
·t]<. :t(1'1p.<:r,ENi)RERAS, n single person a11d JACQUELINE Z. DIAZ, u single person 
who:;c c-urrc I addrciss is 
l '101 sHnRNUN AVIeNUE 
the grnntcc(s), the following dolloribed premises, in J<'OOTENAJ County IDAHO, to wit: 
SEE A'l'TACHED "EXHIBIT A11 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD tho said premises, with their nppurtennncos unto the snid Grantee , heirs 
und assigns forever. And the said Ora11tor do hereby covenant to &nd with the said Granteo(s), that (ll)hc is/are 
the owner(s) in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all encumbrances Except: Subject to all 
existing patent reservations, easements, right of way, protective covenants, zoning ordinances, and applicable 
building codes, Jaws and regulations. 
and that (s)bc will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims what5oevor. 
Datcq: F\.\bruary 5,1999 
Marian B. Baker.eta! vs KAL, LLC, etal Docket No. 44855 
EXHIBIT 




/\ p;ircd ?f la11li Joca.led in_H,c Southeast qunrter, Section 25, Township SO North, Range 6 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, 
1.'.li,ho, i:aid p;m,cl .ucmg "1 n,c1 7" us shown on the Record of Survey flied in Dook 4 of Surveys, !It pngc 26, records ofKootc:nni 
Lounty, more pm·t,cul.idy dc!,cnbcd us follows: 
COMMENCING ftt the Southeast corner, said Section 25, from which the East quarter comer, said Section 25, beuts North 00°42'06" East, a distance of26'!5,32 feot; thence 
Nonh 44°38'06" West li distance of 1846.72 feet to the Southwest comer, snid "Tract 7", the True Point of Bcglrining forth ls description; thence 
Along the boundar)' linQs of said "Tract 7" the following four courses: 
>lonh 00"22'55" East~ distance of662.S3 feet; 
North 89°3 8'49" East n distance of 658, 75 fcot; 
South 00"32'26" West & di.tance of662.39 foot; 
South 89°37'54" West n distance of656.86 feet to tile True Point ofBeslnnlng. 
RESERVING THEREFROM 1hat portion of the abo\1c describe.cl pal'C(!f which is described in nn Ingress, Egress nnd Utllltes E11sement 
as more fully dci,cribud in E~hibit "B" attached hereto nnd incorpon\led herein. 
f'URTHER RESERVING n1UrnFROM u strip of land rifiecn (15) foet In wid1h paralleling the south boundary line of said Parco! I 
which sh.iii ~crvc ns ,m c~sumc111 for dectrlc utilites over lund and underground and lhc maintcn1mce of same. 
Pare~! 2: 
A parcel of lnnd loc,ncd in 1l1e Southeast tJU<1Mer, Section 2S, Township 50 North, Range 6 West, Boise Meridian, Kootcnni County, 
tdal:o, ;aid po1rccl l>clng ''Trnct 8" us st.own on the Record of Survey nted In Book 4 of Surveys, Ht page 26, records ofKootcn11i 
c,,unl)', 111<irc purlicularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Somheast comer, said Section 25, from which the East quarter comer, said Section 25, bears North 00•42'06" 
East, n dist,mcc of2645.32 feet; thence 
North 11°45'38" West a distance of2079.81 feet to the Southeast comer, snid "Tract 8", the True Point of Beginning for this 
description; thenco 
Along the bound"ry lines of s.iid "Tract 811 the following four courses: 
Nunh 00°32'26" East a distance of 660.56 feet: 
South 89°39'44" West n distance of660.64 feet; 
Soulh 00"22'55" West a distance of660.70 feet; 
North 89"38'49" East~ distance of658.75 foet to the True Point of Beginning. 
RESERVING THEREFROM u strip of land sixty (60) feet in width paralleling the north boundary line of Parcel 2 which shall 
serve ilS an casement for ingress, egress and utilities. 
TOGETHER WITH a sixty foot easement of the purpose of ingress, csress and utililies ulong the north boundary line ofTrnct 9, 
legally described in Exhibit "C" and west ofihe Ingress, Egress and Utilitcs E11scment describer.! in Exhibit "B". 
SAID EASEMENTS and all conditions and restrictions relating thereto shall be considers as running with the lnnd and shall bind 
the grantees and its heirs, executors, and mlministrators, and all fu1urc assigns of said premises or uny part or puns thereof. 
i..,f.flfor 
JOl)J/90 




<Xnrr.rtzsn, l!n~ and UtiliU2.l.'J ~) 
A {-'<lrcol ,:,f lnnd lo~t.8>::1 in th~ S\'>uthe.1.1 Quutw~ Sett.itn 25, Townlb(p 50 Notth1 P.nngg tS Wett, ~ Mbrid.u:n. !{oc¢c.'\al County. ldubo, merre pmti~ delorlbsd u follows: 
60 (r.,''j,-i,_,,\ 
A 1.trip of .I.And ii{;~f!fl.jf .fu<:t m widl:h. 'tho oe.nterlm1::1 of which 1: i\trth.r dM.cl.1bed WI COM.MltNCJ:N:G ~t 
tjio Sotlttl~r.t COrt'l-3r, r.s.id Sli!C',•.foa 25, ~p,:,Jat a!t:0 belngdlo 8autbcut oon.w.rof'T111ct 12 .. u sbowr1 cin 
the ~rd of Survey filed in i'$ook 4 l::li' Surve;fti, at ti'~ Z6. ~ of~ County. 6.-on1 which the 
S0utf1 Qua.roor comer, ~d ~ 251 bwi, 8 8Po36'03" WA di~ ot'2612.00 fftt; ~ 
S89"'36'05" W nlm1g the South line of the S01.rtbtut ~r. sa.Jd Seaion 25, a dimmco of708.12 feet to 
tJlo ~ or Bakl Satuh .lloe with the ~liM ofan cotlltuut l:Olld u deaoribod bl the State of ldaho 
l:!i~t filod &.c ln.ct:rumc:nt Nu.mbez- 1455397. Reoon!; ofl~ Cou.nty, and th~ True l?OINT -OP~ 
.Ul3-0lNN1NG fur this ~rlptlon, 
The,:ioe, northerly along said e-em:nrlino th$ fu~ OOUrwt~ 
.N 0.:)"2~'56" Ea dici.."'!l1ee rd''1l.72 ~ 
N 0&0 16119"W n dl~af'l70.39 t~ 
N oov:21•0111 Ea d.i.wtwieb of:nu;g ~i 
N 12'151'41" Ea distance of86.93 n«; 
N 01°36'12" W a dlr.t:tnCb nf'56l,l71\lu.; 
N2I"14'24" Bti di~ ofl05.2Stbct; 
'N 3 S t.:31 '44" B n m!'.,,um.oo af' 101U2 k; 
N 02"35'09" w a dl.ub.u:103 or J 73.S6 ~; 
N 23°.:?;'3.1 11 W a diffll1tet, of 5l.64-.k: 
N l l .. Os,'Oott W a tlimml;)ij of SS.S4 ~ 
N 12"13'40" Ea dir.rancem-st.16 ~ 
-N 34°04'39" Ba~ o£'S>7.00 ~ 
N 27°19'22' ~ a <l:ii;bwcei of 107.92 ~ 
N 38°30'55" lh clltua,oeof4Sl.27 ht; 
N 6S0 U'3S" B s d.ittiuicx, of 131.84 foot; 
N 58°l3'11 11 gQ 6.isb.uie6ofl6l.8lfout; 
N 00°42'24" Ee dktrumo of 52.24 k; 
N 71 °49'2S" W a dli:um~ '1t 155 .2~ ht; 
N S61110'47" W a diztanoe of'143.61 !Mt; 
N 31~1'~3'' W Q dI~oa etf76,76 mt; 
N l.5"S2'S2" W :s dhunco ot U6.:n ~ 
•' 
theao.,, N 23°23'17" W .t d.lstmioe of92.32 k_ tnx:inJ or l*, to the ~ (If Aid~ wftft th& 
Norm linia of the SO\lth.c,ut Qu~. said SectiOA 25 ('11111.d 1hio 11111<) bclca tho Nottb lm• ot ~ £!" aa 
shown oo ~id .R,;oord ofSu.rvoy}, t:bt rom-r.oJr .. TWtMlNU!, fl\im Wf»f.oh th.II But Quarttr~, ooid 
S~tioo 15, ln1:n N 809 38'01" Ea diirum.oeof410.4,g ~ 
The dd~ of said ltrlp of land to be~ ot ~ to befiln ct the South 11.nc, of wd 
Soutbeut Qtlarter~ mid Bhorter.Deid or c,;,ctend,:,d to 'tel"rolnmo at the North~ of Aid Southeat ~ (soo Exhibit~~ attaohed ~o. and by~ made a part hereof). 
SIIIOl U'SAS, WJt;0 
EXHIBIT 
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1S76~9l. "EXRIBIT C.11 
;, pmnJ of hmd locnrcd in the Southeust qunr1er, Section 2S, Township SO Not1h, Runge 6 West, Boise .Meridian, Kootenai County, 
itl;1ho, said parcel being ''Traci 9" 1,s shown 0111/-ie Record of Survey tiled In !look 'I of Sur~eys, at page 26, records of Kootenai Cou111y, 111orc- p:inicul:,dy described ns foffows: 
COMMENCING at the Southeast corner, said Section 25, &om which the East quarter corner, said Section 25, bears North 00°42'06" Eost a distance of:2645.32 feet; thence 
North J 7°45'38" West a distance of2079,8J feet to the Southwest corner, said "Tract 9" the True Point of Be.ginning for this description; llic11cc 
A long tile botmduy Jines of snid "Trnct 9" the followhig four courses; 
North 00"32'26" Bast a distance of660.SG fee!; 
North 89°39'44" East n distance of660.6S foot: 
So,ith 0(J 0 42'0G" West a distance of 660.4 l feet: 
Sou!h 89.38'49" West 11 distance of6SB.76 feet t,;1 the True Point of Beginning. 
'tH}•lfjw 
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